The Intellectual Arbitrariness Objection to Religious Exclusivism: version 1

Here is my presentation of the objection:

The objection here claims that we have an epistemic duty to treat like cases alike: if the evidence I have for p is the same (or similar) to the evidence that you have for ~p, then we should suspend belief with respect to p and ~p.

Response 1: The evidence will, in many or most cases, not be relevantly similarly. The phenomenology (the way the evidence is experienced by the subject) will be different, and thus the internal evidence will be different. Different rankings of evidence will be likely resulting in different overall assessment of the evidence. 

Reply: But those who deny (1) and (2) may have the same phenomenology and whatnot so that there really is relevant similarity—all the way down to how the evidence feels and is assessed. Think of two different detectives with the exact same evidence, same experience on the job, same level of intelligence, etc. and yet they each arrive at a different conclusion. Is that possible? If so, then it seems like it is possible when it comes to religious matters. In the detective case, they should suspend belief (according to the objection we are considering). Same for the religious case.

Response 2: Well, Plantinga (and I agree) do not think that the evidence for the existence of God and the evidence of for the denial of God's existence are on a par. Those who seriously, thoughtfully, patiently, virtuously, humbly, etc consider all the evidence, rationally should give more weight to God's existence than to the denial of God's existence. 

Reply: But suppose we are wrong. Suppose the evidence really is equal. What happens? 

Response 3: Nothing at all may follow. The objection is assuming something like the following principle: 

Epistemic Similarity: If S1 and S2 have all the same evidence, attention, time, etc. with respect to p, and S1 and S2 disagree about p, then S1 and S2 should suspend belief about p.

But lots of people disagree with Epistemic Similarity.  So we should suspend belief about Epistemic Similarity because that's what the principle tells us to do in such cases. The principle commands us to suspend belief in cases of the relevant kind of disagreement. Since there is such disagreement when it comes to the principle itself, we should suspend belief about the principle.  So we can't use it.  


Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

The Problems of the One and the Many

As I mentioned in class the other day, there are a bunch of problems that can be categorized as being related to the problem of the one and the many. The basic issue is that when oneness is prioritized, manyness gets cut out and when manyness is prioritized oneness gets cut out. Or put differently, when unity is most fundamental, diversity gets eliminated and when diversity is most fundamental, unity gets eliminated.  Let’s consider some examples:  Ethics : Making individuals more fundamental than communities results in communities being sacrificed for the sake of the individual. My interests, desires, hopes, etc take precedence over those of the community. If the individual is most fundamental, then it is permissible for the individual to prioritize her interests over those of the community. Making the community more fundamental than the individual results in individuals being sacrificed for the sake of the community. The community’s interest, desires, hopes, etc tak...
Read more

The Intellectual Arbitrariness Objection: Version 2

Suppose you had been born in Saudi Arabia. If you had been you would have been a Muslim. Suppose you had been born in India. If you had been you would have been a Hindu. Suppose you had been born... If you had been, you would have been... Considerations like these can quite easily give rise to the thought that your current religious beliefs (e.g. that God exists, that Jesus is his son and is the savior of the world, ...) are in some sense arbitrary. You are not justified in thinking that the religious beliefs that you actually have are true and thus that every belief that is incompatible with them is false. After all, you only believe what you do because of a kind of accident of birth. This gives rise to the following principle:  If  S 's religious or philosophical beliefs are such that if  S  had been born elsewhere and elsewhen, she wouldn't have held them, then those beliefs are produced by unreliable belief-producing mechanisms and hence have no war...
Read more